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I. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that at least seven million people regularly use

prescription drugs without medical supervision, the majority of which are

addictive.1 This led to a 1983 figure of $60 billion to treat drug abuse in the
United States.2 Who is watching the licensed practitioners who serve as the
gatekeepers of these drugs?
Licensed health care professionals are governed in their practice by a
maze of incongruent rules and regulations. The administrative agency
("Board") in the state where the professional is licensed has authority to
sanction the licensee for inappropriate behavior.3 In addition to Board
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1. Drug and Alcohol Abuse Treatment, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-160(a)(2)
(1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 801 (1994), Historical and Statutory Notes).
2. Id.
at 3207-160(a)(4).
3. In Florida, the state administrative agency for physicians is the Board of Medicine at
the Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, Florida ("Board"). The Board's
disciplinary actions follow the Florida Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 458.327, 329
(1997). They follow the court proceedings of the Administrative Procedures Act, FLA. STAT.
§§ 120.57(1), (2) (Supp. 1998), and the sentencing guide of FLA. ADMiN. CODE (1999)
(formerly FLA. ADMIN. CODE 59 r. 8.001).
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penalties, a health care professional who violates federal or state law in the
course of her practice may also be governed by the respective criminal laws.4
Although an abundance of enthusiastic legislation is available for use in
regulating licensed practitioners, when applied, these laws lead to
inconsistent, unforeseeable, and usually insufficient punishments in
comparison to the culpability of the professional's actions.
Generally when a health care professional prescribes or dispenses
controlled substances inappropriately, a criminal investigation of the
suspected individual will begin. The state prosecutor then has the
responsibility to recognize the individual as a licensed health care
professional and report the criminal charge to the Board. Theoretically, the
criminal trial and state administrative proceeding run concurrently and may
result in dual judgments. However, professional culpability could be
overlooked if the prosecutor either neglects to inform the administrative
agency or the practitioner holds a license to practice in more than one state
and the prosecutor errs by only reporting to the state agency in which the
practitioner was currently working when criminally charged.
Statutes vary among the states and this note is therefore limited to an
exploration of the inequities of sanctions of cases in Florida. In addition,
federal rules that govern physicians who inappropriately prescribe controlled
substances in Florida will be reviewed.5 Part II reviews the legislative
history of the statutes that govern physician prescribing. Part III weighs
criminal charges and defenses. Part IV reviews civil liabilities. In
conclusion, Part V provides an illustration of the inequities of sanctions
towards the more fortunate professional as compared to nonprofessional
defendants.

4. In Florida, the State Attorney General is responsible for criminal charges under the
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. § 893 (Supp.
1996) (amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 by the Controlled Substance Act, Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970), and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, § 2Dl.1 (1998) ("Guidelines"). If there is ever a conflict in these
rules, the statutes prevail over the Guidelines.
5. This note only reviews cases involving validly licensed physicians. Controlled
substances, for purposes of this note, are prescription drugs including narcotics found in
schedules II-IV of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. § 893.03 (Supp.
1996), having a recognized medical use. For a review of pharmacist liabilities see, for
example, P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Revocation or Suspension of License or Permit to
Practice Pharmacy or Operate Drugstore Because of Improper Sale or Distribution of
Narcotic or Stimulant Drugs, 17 A.L.R. 3d 1408 (Supp. 1998). For a review of nursing
liability see, for example, Emile F. Short, Annotation, Revocation of Nurse's License to
Practice Profession,55 A.L.R. 3d 1141 (Supp. 1998).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The first Congressional attempt to regulate both the distribution and
marketing of dangerous drugs was the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,6
which was likewise repealed in 1938.7 In 1914, two attempts at regulation

were passed. The Harrison Act, which was repealed in 1970, 9 and the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act,' 0 which was repealed in 1970.

Finally, in 1970, Congress repealed all prior federal drug control legislation
and enacted the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control2
Act of 1970 ("Act")." Title II of the Act is the Controlled Substance Act.'

Fourteen years later, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was

passed to revise the Act, thereby allowing stricter penalties for violating
narcotics laws.' 3

The idea behind the combination Act, as stated by the

United States Supreme Court in a 1975 case against a physician, was to
create uniformity between the state and federal laws, thereby enabling more
effective communication
in the war against drugs and less subjective
4

sanctions.1

The Act requires all persons who manufacture and distribute controlled

15
substances to register with the Attorney General of the United States.
Physicians who prescribe controlled substances and who fail to register are
subject to criminal penalties under section 822 and 841(a)(1) of the United

6. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938), primarily created to prevent
interstate commerce of adulterated drugs.
7. Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 63-230, 38 Stat. 275 (repealed 1970).
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-901 (1970) [hereinafter Act].
12. 21 U.S.C. § 801.
13. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 revised the Act of 1970 to allow
real property in the scope of civil forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). See, e.g., M.
Lynette Eaddy, How Much is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the Excessive Fines Clause
After Austin v. United States, 45 FLA. LAW REv. 709 (1993).
14. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975). In Moore, it was argued that a
registered physician cannot be prosecuted under section 841 because section 841, which
carries much harsher penalties, is reserved for an individual "outside the 'legitimate
distribution chain."' Id. at 130. Other sections such as sections 842 and 843, which are more
lenient were proffered as the correct avenue of prosecution. Id.at 131. The Court held that
section 841 is applicable when the activities fall outside the normal course of professional
medical practice and congressional intent is not to set up distinct sections for punishment of
differing classes of individuals. Id. at 124, 132. Moore was charged under 21 U.S.C §
841 (a)(1) with the unlawful distribution of methadone, a schedule II narcotic. Id. at 124.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 822 (1994).
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States Code.16 Under the Act, physicians are also required to keep records of
controlled substance distribution. Failure to comply with the Act can result
in criminal sanctions.1 8 In United States v. Betancourt,19 the court explained
that once registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), the
physician is required to prescribe controlled substances in the usual course
of professional practice and for legitimate medical purposes. 2° The Act
defines "dispense" as "to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate
user... pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the
prescribing .... administering[, ... packaging, labeling or compounding" of
a controlled substance.21 "Dispense," therefore, connotes a lawful order. If
a physician unlawfully prescribes a controlled substance he has not
dispensed under this statute, he has "distributed" in violation of law. 22
In addition to the Act, there are parallel state administrative rules
imposed by the medical licensing board that could result in physician
liability.2 3 The Board has been empowered to discipline a licensee b 4
suspending or revoking the practitioner's license, by reprimand, or by fine.
16. See United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (lth Cir. 1984), which involved a
physician's refusal to register in order to dispense Schedule II N drugs, which included
methaqualone. Id. at 1427. The Court explained that:
To possess or dispense a controlled substance, doctors must be licensed to
practice medicine and register annually with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). 21 U.S.C.A. § 822. Doctors may acquire and
dispense controlled substances "to the extent authorized by their registration."
Id. § 822(b). The registration application contains a separate box denoting
each schedule and directs applicants to check each box which is applicable in
registering for desired schedules. The statute mandates that the DEA register
physicians in every schedule they check if the physicians are authorized by
state law to dispense the substances included in that schedule.
Id. at 1427 n.1.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 830 (1994).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 822).
19. 734 F.2d 750 (11 th Cir. 1984).
20. Id. at 757. In Betancourt, the court reasoned that prescribing methaqualone
excessively, without further medical inquiry, is in violation of section 841 as not a legitimate
medical purpose. Id. at 757.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1996).
22. United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. TIMOTHY S. JOST ET AL., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A
Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 330 (1993); The Medical Practice

Act,

FLA. STAT.

§ 458 (1993).

24. Jost, supra note 23. This note will only look at section 458.331(1) of the Florida
Statutes:
(c) Being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere
to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction which directly
relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine.
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Once the Board decides to cite a physician for misconduct, the case becomes
public record.25 Formal disciplinary sanctions must be initiated by citation,
thereby placing the physician's reputation on the line. 26 The Board's final
decision to cite a physician is a reflection of the serious nature of the
offense.27 In an Ohio study of 200 complaints lodged against physicians,
only2 five (2.5%) resulted in formal disciplinary action by citation. Potential concurrent liability of a practitioner under the numerous
Board rules and inconsistent criminal statutes has lead to much controversy
and confusion, leaving the practitioner with ripe arguments focused on
constitutional invasions, legislative intent, and statutory interpretations.
III. CRIMINAL LABIrrY
Many criminal defenses for physicians are founded in the area of
statutory interpretation. For example, section 893.13(1)(a) of the Florida
Statutes uses the word "selling" to define the criminal act of dispensing
controlled substances. 29 In the case of Cilento v. State,30 a physician,
Cilento, dispensed controlled substances by means of a prescription issued in
bad faith, not in the course of medical practice. 31 He claimed his actions
were "prescribing" and not "selling," therefore, not in violation of the Act,
32
which expressly requires selling of a controlled substance for sanctions.
The court held
33 that prescribing in bad faith is "selling" through statutory
interpretation.

(q) Prescribing, dispensing, administering, mixing, or otherwise preparing a
legend drug, including any controlled substance, other than in the course of
the physician's professional practice. For the purposes of this paragraph, it
shall be legally presumed that prescribing, dispensing, administering, mixing,
or otherwise preparing legend drugs, including all controlled substances,
inappropriately or in excessive or inappropriate quantities is not in the best
interest of the patient and is not in the course of the physician's professional
practice, without regard to his or her intent.
FLA. STAT. §§ 458.331(l)(c), (q) (Supp. 1998).
25. Jost, supra note 23 at 326.
26. Id. at 327.
27. Id. at 330.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(a) (1997).

30.
31.
32.
33.

377 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979).
Id.at 664.
Id. at 666.
Id.
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Therefore, a physician who is alleged to have prescribed a controlled
substance in violation of the Act can only be found criminally liable if the
prescriptions were written in bad faith.3 4 Bad faith can be proven when the
prescribing was done in opposition of proper medical standards. 35 However,
it should be noted that nonconformity to the standard medical practice is
only evidence in support of bad faith and must further be proven by medical
expert testimony. 36 The burden of going forward with evidence to challenge
the Act and establish an exception or exemption to the Act rests with the
defendant.37 This must be distinguished from the burden of persuading the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the crime, as
this burden always remains with the prosecution.
By contrast, other courts have held that a physician could not be
prosecuted for selling controlled substances when the physician has
prescribed the drugs to another. 38 These courts stated that the term "selling"
did not adequately describe the physician's action of rescribing within the
course of patient treatment.39 In Ex parte Evers, when the physician
prescribed amphetamines to a patient for alleged fatigue, it was found that
while the statute could apply to a licensed practitioner, the issue was whether
it is applicable to a physician who writes a prescription in the course of
practice. 41 In reaching its holding, the court stated that the criminal statutes
are to be strictly construed in a light most favorable to the defendant. 42
Testimony, in this case, could not establish the actual selling of pills by the
physician under the statutory construction, and the statute should not be
extended by construction. 43 Statutory interpretation varies among the
districts making conclusions of law difficult to ascertain.
A license to practice medicine is the basic requirement to prescribe
substances that may be otherwise illegal. A license does not, however,
protect thephysician from state intervention by the police. In United States
v. Moore, a licensed physician argued that he could not be prosecuted
34. Id.
35. Cilento, 377 So. 2d at 666.

36. 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) (1970).
37. Id.
38. Ex parte Evers, 434 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 1983), rev'd, 434 So. 2d 817 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983). See also Rudell v. State, 453 So. 2d 1329 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding statute
does not apply to a licensed physician who writes a prescription within the scope of his
registration).
39. Evers, 434 So. 2d at 816.
40. 434 So. 2d at 813.
41. Id. at 816.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 816-17.

44. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
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under the federal Act 5 for distribution or dispensing a controlled substance
The Court
because he was acting within his professional practice.'
disagreed, holding that Congress did not intend two separate and distinct
47
penalty systems, one for a licensed physician and the other for a "pusher.
The Court stated that the defendant was exempt under section 841(a)(1) of
the United States Code from only the legitimate dispensing of controlled
substances. 48 There was nothing in the statute to infer that a registrant is
exempt from prosecution when49he acted like a "pusher" outside of the usual
course of professional practice.
Additionally, statutory interpretation has uncovered the fact that
prescribing controlled substances constitutes a "delivery" if such act of
prescribing could be reasonably contemplated to result in actual transfer to
Delivery is defined by the Florida
the patient by a pharmacist.5
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
51 to include
constructive and attempted transfers as well as actual delivery.
In the case of Felker v. State,52 the physician argued he was permitted to
carry cocaine and admitted to having more at his medical office when he was
found to have cocaine residue in a nasal spray bottle, on a straw, and a
A search of his office revealed three bottles of cocaine
knife5 3
hydrochloride, a schedule II controlled substance, in his personal desk
drawer.5 4 The court stated that the Act makes it unlawful for any person to
have possession of any controlled substance in a "carte blanche" fashion.,5 5
The court further stated that allowing physicians to possess controlled
substances for their own personal, nonmedical use, was not the legislature's
intention.56 However, in this case, despite the drug residue evidence, the
physician was found not guilty because there was not enough evidence to
prove he was in actual possession of the drug at the time of the arrest.57 This
case demonstrates that the statutory authority is available to convict

45. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
46. Moore, 423 U.S. at 131.
47. Id. at 132.
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id.; see also United States v. Steele, 105 F.3d 603 (lth Cir. 1997) (extending
violations from physicians to pharmacists).

50. State v.Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
51. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 893.02(5) (1997).
52. 323 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. App. 1984).
53. Id. at 819-20.

54. Id. at 820.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Felker,323 S.E.2d at 821.
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physicians criminally, but the professional seems to elude the law with
loopholes.
A.

ConstitutionalChallenge

The Act has been challenged by criminally charged physicians on
constitutional grounds. These grounds have included vagueness, invasion of
Tenth Amendment residual state police powers, right to privacy in the
physician/patient relationship, due process, and cruel and unusual
punishment. Historically, statutory challenges based on constitutional
grounds have been unsuccessful. As early as 1914, contentions that statutory
terms, such as "legitimate use," were void for vagueness, were without
success. 58 The court held, in Commonwealth v. Gabhart, that the mere fact
that "legitimate use" remained undefined
by the statute, did not warrant
59
finding the statute void for vagueness.
Another unsuccessful constitutional argument arose when the
Department of Professional Regulation ("DPR") performed a warrantless,
routine administrative search of a pharmacy and found suspect prescriptions
for Quaaludes (methaqualone) written by an oral surgeon.
The surgeon
attacked the constitutionality of the search as a violation of his reasonable
expectation of privacy. 61 The court found that the physician had no grounds
for attacking the constitutionality
of the search and upheld the physician's
62
thirty-day suspension.
Vagueness has also failed as a constitutional argument. The good faith
standard of section 893.05(1) of the Florida Statutes states that a licensed
physician, in the course of his practice, may prescribe, mix, dispense, and
administer controlled substances. 63 When a physician wrote a prescription
for a patient, subsequently found not written in "good faith," he challenged
this clause as unconstitutionally vague.64 The Supreme Court of Florida held
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it passed the test that
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." 65
In controlled substances cases, even where the suspected physician is
visited by undercover agents posing as patients, the defense has not been
58. Commonwealth v. Gabhart, 169 S.W. 514 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914).
59. Id. at 516.
60. Cushing v. Department of Prof'l Reg., 416 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
61. Id.at 1198.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 893.05(1) (1997).
64. State v. Weeks, 335 So. 2d 274,276 (Fla. 1976).
65. Id. at 276.
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successful. It has been established that these actions by undercover agents
are not grounds for suppression of evidence, although entrapment has been a
successful defense.66 The key to entrapment is to determine if the
undercover agents induced the defendant to act, or if the defendant was
If a
predisposed, and was merely given the opportunity to do so.'
68
predisposition to act can be established, entrapment may fail.
Other states have challenged other aspects of the Act on constitutional
grounds, without avail. 69 Typically, a physician who is indicted for
unlawfully prescribing a controlled substance is more likely to prevail if the
defense avoids the constitutional issues and focuses on weak construction
and interpretation of the Act.
B.

Criminal Charges: Double Jeopardy?

Physicians' actions are investigated both criminally and by a board,
thus arguments have arisen that findings of the board are final, collaterally
estopping the prosecution from proceeding. 70 The argument that the state is
estopped from prosecuting the defendant is usually rejected. In the case of
State v. Fritz,7 the court explained that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
between the State Attorney's
does not apply because there is a lack of privity 72
office and the state's administrative department.
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
and when a civil penalty is considered punishment for the purpose of double
working as a manager
v. Halper,74 Halper was
jeopardy. 73 In United Statessubmitted
sixty-five false claims to Blue Cross
of a medical laboratory and

66. White v. State, 247 S.E.2d 536, 538 (Ga. App. 1978).

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1975) (Missouri), the court found
the failure to delineate parole terms not vague. Id. at 986. In United States v. Atkinson, 513
F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1975) (North Carolina), the court held a 12-year sentence does not violate
the Eighth Amendment as unusual or excessive punishment. Id. at 42. "[I]n the course of
professional practice" was held not void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment; further,
the Act, as applied to physicians, does not violate the Tenth Amendment by invading state
police powers. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1973) (Georgia); United
States v. Rosenburg, 515 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1975) (California).
70. State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1987).
71. Id. at 1157.
72. Id. at 1166.
73. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "[Nior
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
74. Halper,490 U.S. at 435.
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and Blue Shield. 75 Blue Cross mistakenly paid the claims and passed the
charges over to the Federal Government Medicare division. 76 Halper was
convicted on sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false claims statute,
imprisoned for two years, and fined $5000.77 The Government then brought
Halper up on charges of violating the Civil False Claims Act, 7 8 and fined him
$130,000. 7 1 The district court held that due to Halper's criminal conviction,
an additional civil punishment of $130,000, when actual damages were
significantly smaller, would amount to double jeopardy.80
The Government argued on appeal that double jeopardy only applies
when the second punishment is also criminal.8 1 The Court reasoned that
punishment
the purposes of double jeopardy can be both criminal and
•
- 82
. for ..
civil.
Civil judgments can impose punitive damages that far exceed
remedial goals and therefore serve punishment purposes.83 The court held,
that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, if a defendant has already been
punished criminally, he may not be subjected to a civil sanction for the same
offense if the civil penalty is retributive and not remedial in nature. 84 The
civil punishment of $130,000 was found to violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause and the case was remanded for adjustment to a remedial amount. 5
The finding in Halper clouds the seemingly bright line of double
jeopardy. An assessment must be made of whether the completeness of the
punishment under one statute is a potential bar to liability under another
applicable statute. When it comes to a physician, where is that line drawn?
Who decides if a simple suspension of a medical license accompanied by a
fine is adequate "punishment," thereby barring criminal sanctions? This
note by no means purports to answer these questions, but attempts to bring
these issues to the forefront for examination.
In 1996, in Borrego v. Agency for Health Care Administration,86 a case
of first impression in Florida, a physician was previously convicted of
federal Medicare fraud, then using some facts of this underlying conviction,
he was later subjected to a licensure suspension by the Board. The court
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 437.
Id.
Id.
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994).
Halper,490 U.S. at 437.
Id. at 438.
Id. at441.

82. Id. at 448.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Halper,490 U.S. at 448-49.
Id. at 452.
675 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 667.
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held the suspension did not constitute double jeopardy. 88 This holding was
based on the much accepted reasoning that disciplinary actions of the state
Board are designed to protect public welfare rather than punish the
individual.89 Although this recent case is promising in that, as Congress
intended, crimes are not going without dual sanctions, the civil sanctions
imposed on the physician in Borrego were only a $5000 fine and a
suspension of his license for eighteen months. What if the physician had
received a license revocation or imprisonment previously, would this have
been civil "punishment" enough to constitute double jeopardy for the second
offense?
Another avenue the prosecution may take is that of the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine. This doctrine allows successive state and federal
prosecutions for the same crime.91 However, this avenue, although
supported by the United States Supreme Court, is littered with as much, if
not more,
controversy than double jeopardy, and outside the scope of this
92
note.

IV. CIVIL LIABILITY AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE REVIEW
State Boards' investigations of physicians originate from two primary
sources: Letters or telephone calls from patients, relatives, or friends
complaining of mismanaged care or inappropriate conduct; other notices
from hospitals, insurance companies, and similar entities, as well as criminal
convictions and similar information.9 3 When an action is taken and a
physician's license is revoked or suspended by the Board for inappropriately
prescribing a controlled substance, the cases can generally be divided into
two categories. The first category involves the practitioner that has been

88. Id.
89. Id. at 668. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 n.2 (1938); Munch v.
Davis, 196 So. 491, 493-94 (Fla. 1940). "The purposes of the imposition of discipline are to
punish.., deter [and] rehabilitate." FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r 8.001 (1997).
90. Interview with David Osterhouse, Regulation Specialist II, Office of the Agency
Clerk, Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, Fla., Board of Medicine Final
OrdersInvolving ImproperPrescribingor CriminalConvictions (March 14, 1997).
91. Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and DoubleJeopardy, 73 N.C.L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1994).

92. Id. Dual sovereignty is supported by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91-94 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332

(1978).
93. Jost, supra note 23, at 310-11. The number of complaints and referrals to the state
medical licensing boards has been increasing. Id. The number of complaints has almost
doubled in eight years, ranging recently from 5000 to 7000 per year. Id.
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convicted of a prior criminal offense in the course of medical practice.94 The
second category involves those practitioners that are charged solely under
the rules of the administrative agency. 95
Based on information acquired from Florida's Agency for Health Care
Administration, 109 physicians have been cited under the state's
administrative agency rules between January 1992 to December 1996. 96
Ideally, the criminal proceeding is instituted or the criminal judgment
reached before the administrative proceeding begins. However, it has been
acknowledged that the Board may actually begin the investigation in some
cases and subsequently report the alleged criminal violations to the state
attorney. 97 Additionally, it is well known that few proceedings ever reach
the courts. Cases not published in the reporters or available in electronic
databases are not reflected in this summary. Also, given that in a license
revocation or suspension proceeding, the hearing officer's findings of fact
need be based only on "competent substantial evidence," the civil charges
may be dropped under certain circumstances upon termination of the
98
criminal proceeding.
Since the authority to revoke or suspend a physician's license for
inappropriate prescribing of controlled substances is vested in an
administrative agency-in Florida, the Florida Board of Medicine-the
courts generally defer to the agency. Findings are generally affirmed unless
they are excessively9 harsh, shocking, or do not involve an element of intent
or moral turpitude.
The following examines a few examples of a court overturning the
Board's recommendations for sanctions. In the first example, the Board
gave a doctor a six month suspension which was set aside by the court on the
grounds that it was too harsh.1° The Board found that the doctor violated
federal law by prescribing morphine "for office use only" and administering

94. The Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. § 458.33 1(1)(c) (Supp. 1998).
95. Id. § 458.331(1)(q).
96. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90. Seventy-five physicians were cited
under section 458.331(1)(q) of the FloridaStatutes for inappropriate prescribing. Id. Thirtyfour physicians were cited under section 458.331 (1)(c) of the Florida Statutes for conviction
of a crime relating to the practice of medicine or ability to practice medicine. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1382-83 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Arthurs v. Stem, 560 F.2d 477 (Mass. 1977).
99. See generally Richardson v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the Board's penalty was too harsh, and dismissing the
Board's comparison of facts to a case which involved grossly immoral conduct).
100. Id. at 236.
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it to his patients.101 The court said that although he did violate federal law
by inappropriate use of morphine, he did it without the intent to conceal. 10 2
In even more recent examples, sanctions by the Board upon finding
physicians prescribing excessive or inappropriate controlled substances have
also been met with opposition by the courts. 10 3 In Hoover v. Agency for
Health Care Administration,1 4 the court found that the agency failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence, that Hoover, the physician,
prescribed controlled substances in violation of section 458.331(1)(q) of the
Florida Statutes.10 5 Hoover was treatinj0patients with intractable pain with
An investigation was conducted,
large quantities of controlled substances.
however, and insufficient evidence was presented by expert testimony to
disprove the actual disease of the patients. 0 7 The sanctions by the Board
were subsequently reversed.108 Despite these few cases, because the courts
typically defer so much authority to the administrative agency it is important
for counsel to be familiar with the administrative procedures.'6
When a physician prescribes excessive quantities of controlled
substances, a suspension or revocation of the license to practice medicine is
usually warranted; the prescription will be deemed inappropriate unless the
physician can show through expert testimony that the controlled substances
he prescribed were: 1) for patients with serious medical problems requiring
the control of pain; 2) in amounts not beyond recommended doses; and 3)
for a patient who was already tolerant of such doses. 110
In a case involving unprofessional conduct where a physician
prescribed unlawfully, or in excessive quantities, a controlled substance to a
known addict, the court looked to the surrounding circumstances. The Board
found that the physician's treatment was incomplete and did not meet
community standards. Unfamiliar with the treatment of narcotics addicts,

101. Id. at 234-35.
102. Id. at 236.

103. See Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1382. See also Reese v. Department of Prof'l Reg., 471
So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. -1985); Sneij v. Department of Prof 1Reg., 454 So. 2d
795,796 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
104. 676 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
105. Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1385. See also Jost, supra note 23.
106. Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1381.
107. Id. at 1385.
108. Id. at 1380.
109. Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57(1), (2) (1997).
110. See generally Johnston v. Department of Prof I Reg., 456 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the prescribing of Dilaudid
was improper because it may have been reasonable under the circumstances). Id. at 944.
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the Board reprimanded and limited the physician's riAht to prescribe
controlled substances when he treats this class of patients.
Suspension of a physician's license for prescribing controlled
substances without adhering to minimum community standards, which may
involve first giving a physical examination, for example, is usually upheld by
the courts.
In a case where a physician prescribed phentermine and
phendimetrazine, schedule IV controlled substances, to patients under his
continued care without a physical exam, his license was suspended and the
Board's proceedings were upheld by the court, which
found that this practice
13
did not meet the minimum community standard.'
In 1993, a physician appealed a six-month suspension of his medical
license and a fine of $3000 for violation of section 458.331(1)(q) of the
Florida Statutes, in addition to other sections. 14a The physician stated that
due to the inadequacies of the state administrative agency in compiling an
index of prior decisions to use as precedent, the judgment was potentially
prejudicial.' 15 The court upheld the complaint stating that although the
administrative agencies are not bound by prior decisions, the core of the
judicial system is the doctrine of stare decisis, which was not readily
available to the defendant. 16 Ironically, while escaping liability on a
technicality in 1993, this physician was again cited by the Board in
December of 1995 for the same charges.
This time the physician
voluntarily relinquished his license. 18 Despite the frequency of citations in
Florida, the Board, although it does impose sanctions, often fails to
implement penalties that are sufficient to deter misconduct. 1 9 Probably the
most paradoxical case in Florida involves a psychiatrist who fought the
emergency suspension of his license in 1991, calling the suspension an
unconstitutional procedure.
The psychiatrist was addicted to Demerol
111. Id. at 943.
112. Scheininger v. Department of Prof 1 Reg., 443 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
113. Id.
114. Gessler v. Department. of Bus. & Prof 1Reg., 627 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).

115. Id. at 503.
116. Id. at 504.
117. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin., Board of Med. v. Blender, 18 FALR
916 (1995) (physician self injected Darvocet and Valium for four years and received only a
license suspension); Agency for Health Care Admin., Board of Med. v. Royce, 18 FALR 941
(1995) (psychiatrist's patient died after she self injected herself with controlled substances at
her home. The doctor was charged with a record-keeping violation and was issued a letter of
reprimand).
120. Garcia v. Department of Prof 1 Reg., 581 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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(meperidine), a schedule II controlled substance, and denied the problem. 2 1
He also aided in the escape of a minor from a mental institute, took her to a
motel, and injected her with Demerol.' 22 The court held that emergency
suspension of his license under section 120.60(6) of the FloridaStatutes was
not unconstitutional and the suspension was upheld.'2 During research, it
was subsequently learned that the psychiatrist in this case was cited by the
state agency once again, five years later. 24 In December of 1996, he was
charged with eight counts of violations of sections 458.331 and 458.327 of
the Florida Statutes, including failure to maintain records for injectable
Demerol and practicing with a revoked license.12 This time, the sanctions
imposed by the Board were $5000 and a reprimand. 26 Public records to date
show no criminal procedures pending on this psychiatrist, and although
reprimanded, his initial suspension in 1991 is not permanent.
Using this case as an example to determine potential penalties from
plain statutory application, the conduct of this psychiatrist, at a minimum,
violated: 1) multiple sections of the Florida Medical Practice Act; 27 2) The
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act; 12 3) the
Controlled Substance Act;129 and 4) the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. 3 0 ("Guidelines"). The Guidelines equate one gram of Demerol
as equivalent to fifty grams of marijuana.13 ' Simple calculations for a fiveyear addiction would conservatively place the psychiatrist at a base level of
fourteen of the Guidelines, for 6.5 kilograms of marijuana. 13 In addition,

121. Id. at 961.
122. Id.
123. Id. If the Board finds an immediate, serious danger to the public health, safety,
and welfare, it can require emergency suspension or limitation of a physician's license. FLA.
STAT. § 120.60(6) (1996).
124. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90.
125. Section 458.327 of the FloridaStatutes includes: 1(a) practicing without active
license; l(b) practicing with a suspended or revoked license; and 2(d) leading the public to
believe one is licensed without holding an active license. FLA. STAT. §§ 458.327 (1)(a), (b)
(1993).
126. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90.
127. FLA. STAT. § 458 (1993).
128. FLA. STAT. § 893 (1997).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
130. UNrrED STATES SENTENCING GUIDiNES MANuAL § 2D1.1 (1998).
131. See Commentary to section 2Dl.1 of the Guidelines (providing drug equivalency
tables equating 1 gram of meperidine to 50 grams of marijuana). Id.
132. Using a conservative calculation, if the physician used a 50 milligrams-permilliliter injection one weekly for five years, this is 130 grams of Demerol. Then converting
to marijuana, per the guidelines, would require multiplying by a factor of 50, thus equating to
6.5 kilograms of marijuana. In Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), the Court
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appendix to section 3B1.3 of Title 18, of the United States Code, mandates
an upward departure of two levels from the base offense where the defendant
abuses a position of public or private trust in violation of section 841 of Title
21, of the United States Code.133 Therefore, using these conservative
calculations, this psychiatrist is at level sixteen of the Guidelines. The
Guidelines also require that prior convictions be considered. 134 Though he
was not criminally indicted for his 1991 offense, it will be used in this
calculation despite the oversight by the state, resulting in a sentence
calculation of twenty-one to twenty-seven months of imprisonment.
However, the Guidelines are not the only rules that apply. The application
of section 841(b)(1)(c) of The Act is for controlled substances in schedules I
and II, and mandates a sentence of not more than thirty years imprisonment
and a fine not to exceed $2,000,000.135 Congressional statutes prevail over
the sentencing guidelines if there is a conflict; therefore, the latter
calculation under section 841 should control. 136 Amazingly, the calculation
is still not complete until the Board has a chance to impose its sanctions.
Rule 59R-8.001 of FloridaAdministrative Code,'37 and the Medical Practice
Act, 138 would cite the physician with multiple violations resulting in a fine
139
from $500 to $10,000 and from one-year probation to a license revocation.
This example portrays the incongruency in the rules, and the potential
difficulty in prevailing with a fair and foreseeable sentence. Which of the
punishments above is appropriate, and if one sanction was imposed, is that
sanction enough to constitute "punishment" therefore barring, via double
jeopardy, further prosecution? Perhaps the legislation itself is the reason for
the reluctance to sanction licensed professionals.

held that the court of appeals reviewed the sentencing scheme and found it is rational. Id. at
456.
133. 18 U.S.C. app. § 3B1.3 (1995).
134. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.1 (1995).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c) (1994). See also, supra note 4.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).

137.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.

r. 59R-8.001 (1997).

138. The Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1997).
139. Under rule 59R-8.001 of the FloridaAdministrative Code Annotated and section
458.331 of the Florida Statutes, inappropriate or excessive prescribing requires a fine from
$250 to $5000 and from one-year probation to revocation; self prescribing a scheduled drug
requires a fine from $250 to $5000 and from one-year probation to revocation; improper
prescribing of a schedule II controlled substance requires a fine from $250 to $5000 and
probation, or two year suspension and probation. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59R-8.001
(1997); FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1997). However, the Board reserves its right to deviate from
these guidelines for multiple violations and trade or sale of a controlled substance.
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V. CONCLUSION: ARE ALL "PUSHERS" TRULY EQUAL?

Ultimately, the physician maintains an unwritten affirmative defense by
the mere fact that he or she is a physician. Consider, for example, the
infamous case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. His killing machine used a controlled
substance, Thiopental, which he acquired and maintained illegally, in
violation of civil and criminal laws. Although Dr. Kevorkian's license to
practice medicine was suspended by the Board on November 20td, 1991,140 it
was not until March 26, 1999, that Dr. Kevorkian was found guilty of second
degree murder. 41 Over 130 lives were lost during that eight year delay, and,
even then, Dr. Kevorkian was free on bond for three weeks while awaiting
sentencing.' 42 Judge Jessica Cooper, who issued the order, seemed to
endorse the idea that while Dr. Kevorkian had killed illegally, he is still not

really a murderer. 143

In Florida, a license to practice medicine is considered a privilege
which may be withdrawn by the sovereign to preserve the health and welfare
of the public and maintain good order in society. 144 The purpose of enacting
section 458 of the FloridaStatutes is to protect the public from practitioners
that cannot comply with standards of safe practice. 145 However, once
remedial penalties are imposed and the practitioner's license is revoked by
the Board, the practitioner becomes a person. Therefore, protecting the
public from the practitioner is not enough; the public also needs to be
protected from the person. The various arms of the criminal rules are looked
to at this point for help in actual punishment. As stated boldly in a Senate
Report in 1983, "a sentencing guideline system is intended to treat all classes
of offenses committed by all categories of offenders consistently."' 146 The
legislature admits, in reports such as this, that society consists of differing
classes of criminals. To overcome this pitfall, Congress has enacted and
supported broad rules with the good faith intent to treat all "pushers" equal,
however, little effort is exerted by the state to use this machinery handed to
them by Congress.

140. Detroit Free Press, Key Dates in Kevorkian's Crusade (March 26, 1999) (last
visited April 9, 1999) <http://www.freep.coni news/extra2/qkchron26.htm>.
141. Detroit Free Press, Convicted of Murder (March 27, 1999) (last visited April 9,
1999) <http://www.freep.com/news/extra2/qkevo272.htm>.
142. Id.; Key Datesin Kevorkian's Crusade,supranote 140.
143. National Post Online, MedicalHit Man's Mission Stopped (March 27, 1999) (last
visited April 9, 1999) <http:llwww.nationalpost.comlnews.asp?s2=national&s3--reporter
&f--990327/2418065.html>.
144. Munch v. Davis, 196 So. 491,493-94 (Fla. 1940).
145. FLA. STAT. § 458.301(1993).
146. S.REP.No. 98-225, at 45-46 (1983).
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